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pose that it can be reached by resorting once more to the rusty, barbarous, and obsolete weapons of our ancestors. But I do believe, if we put our penal law, as Lord Rosebery would say, on an efficient and business-like footing in the matter of juvenile offenders and in the matter of prison treatment, that we can largely reduce the proportions of professional crime.

WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON.

LONDON.

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## THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF FREEDOM.

THERE is something significant in the very perversity with which this question of freedom forces itself upon our attention. No theory has met with so many apparently overwhelming defeats, and yet been so little disturbed. The Ptolemaic system of astronomy, having been overthrown by Copernicus, has remained dead. Freedom has been declared absurd and childish; and has been disproved with all the rigor of the scientific method; but, unlike the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, it still shows unmistakable signs of life. Its survival is all the more remarkable when we consider that it is opposed in spirit to all theory. To understand is to coördinate and unify. The consummation shining ahead of the theoretical man in his inquiry, is the perfectly ordered universe where the flower in the crannied wall is the key to all truth. What a bungling thing is freedom, when you compare it with such an ideal! Yet no generation has refused to entertain it as a theoretical possibility, and it is allowed to take shape and stalk abroad even in academic circles. Now it seems quite certain that if man has clung to a theoretical monstrosity with steady and unabated tenacity, it must satisfy some profound and abiding practical need. When ideas have survived a long process of demonstration and counter-demonstration, they are fairly entitled to a place among those human ideals which are suggested by that perennial and paramount problem of life. Kant cannot have been all wrong when he called freedom a postulate along with God and immortality, and found their roots in

the moral nature of man. I propose in this discussion to question the common moral consciousness about this matter of freedom, in order to discover what is there *meant* by it, and what is there *gained* by it. We may then turn to certain of the reasonings of the metaphysicians, in order to discover whether this meaning and this value are there provided for. Possibly the meaning is ignorance and the value illusion, but we can only find out by first taking the moral man at his word. Hence we begin neither with metaphysics nor even with ethics, but with the moral life.

The moral consciousness of man is a long story, and the end is not yet. But among other things we know that it apprehends, be it ever so vaguely, a standard and a set of values to which the individual attaches an unutterable sanctity. Equipped with his measure of good and evil, finite man dares to apply it to the universe, and even to condemn the universe out of his own private heart. These moral values demand the unflinching loyalty of him to whom they are revealed, even though they lead him out to do battle against overwhelming odds. Conscience submits to no majority, though the powers of Heaven and Hell combine against it. Hence that old tragedy of the religious consciousness: impotence demanding goodness of omnipotence. The obedience which the goodness of his ideals requires of him, a man calls his *duty*, and he acknowledges *responsibility* in so far as this same duty involves both loyalty and watchful efficiency. Duty and responsibility are terms which signify to most men the heart of life. The voice of duty gives a touch of sublimity to the most paltry of human beings. Duty violated, responsibility repudiated, mean worthlessness and shame. Duty obeyed, responsibility fulfilled, mean worth and honor. This cluster of meanings together with approval or disapproval, and merit or demerit, constitute our ordinary criticism of the conduct of life. With these terms we are accustomed to measure and value our neighbor and ourselves. They are the vocabulary of the universal philosophy of life, as well as the symbols of social welfare. We have now to discover in what sense *freedom* is an essential term in this same vocabulary. What do men mean

when they say that freedom denotes a practical experience and a moral value, inseparable from the general conception of life that has just been described?

In the first place, it is to be remarked that the sin and pain in the world fill men with less despair when they are not conceived as the direct expression of God's will. Moral loyalty makes religion impossible except God be acquitted of complicity in sin. The human spirit seeks relief from the incubus of a belief that lying and murder and innocent suffering are rooted in the vitals of the universe. A world in which an essential purity is contrasted with irrelevant or accidental evil, is a better world for a moral individual to live in, than one in which this evil is an inevitable constituent of the whole. In this connection freedom very clearly means the denial that everything is inevitable. The universe is said to be such that it admits, whether through free human agency or otherwise, of certain unnecessary things. It is a world in which irrelevant events occur. There are spots in such a universe that were not filled from the beginning, but which remain to be filled in one of several ways; and here, we say, evil slips in. Freedom means *alternative possibilities*. Though a certain crime may now be a matter of history, it might not have occurred; there was another possibility for that moment of time. So we can consistently regret that it was not otherwise, as in truth it might have been.

Let us turn for a confirmation of this notion of freedom to the central aspect of the moral consciousness. Is it not true that when we claim freedom for the life of duty and responsibility, we are asking again for relief from the inevitable? The moral world is a world in which we reproach ourselves and others for what has taken place, and urge ourselves and others to a more resolute performance of duty in the future. I am ashamed of myself for an act that is past when I believe that the act might have been otherwise; not that the universe might have been otherwise, but that with the rest of the universe up to that moment the same, this particular act might have been otherwise. If I knew better, then the reproach implies that I might have attended to my knowledge; if I ought

to have known better, then the reproach implies that I might have taken steps to acquire such knowledge. In either case I imply that somewhere it was possible that another event should have been substituted for the actual event, related events remaining substantially the same. On the other hand I face the future with determination and resolution, when I believe that I am to make it good by my free new purpose. Duty demands of me that I meet the occasion, and perform that which I may freely perform. In my sense of responsibility I am reminded that if I fail, evil will slip in where good belongs. The spirit of this sort of life dwells only in a world of possibilities. Every act which it inspires declares that the real which becomes through human means is not inevitable. The practical significance of such a consciousness of freedom, consists in the fact that out of it issues *the will to achieve*. The issue has been much obscured by using the term as though it represented an ideal state or condition of the individual. But obviously freedom cannot be at the same time the object and the presupposition of duty. To maintain that I ought to be free, is to presuppose the realization of the ideal as present in the very life that is urged to pursue it. Freedom is a moral circumstance, and not an object for the moral will; though in so far as the belief in its truth is a part of the moral will itself, it may be said to have an indispensable moral significance. When I acknowledge my duty and pursue the good, I am conscious of using my freedom. To disprove the truth of freedom would not affect the moral ideal for better or for worse. Nor would it deny the power of the human will, and the importance for progress of individual initiative. But it would threaten the appealing power of all these conceptions. It would devitalize the individual's moral life, because it would deny the consciousness that fosters the individual's moral earnestness. We may indeed doubt whether in respect of their own lives individuals could ever be persuaded to disbelieve in freedom, but the cogency of our argument is not contingent upon such a possibility. Where a characteristic state of mind is found to contain constantly associated aspects, it is reason-

able to argue hypothetically that the disappearance of one of these aspects would negate the whole.

There has been a very general failure to apprehend the exact nature of the part played by this consciousness of freedom. It has even been argued that a disbelief in freedom *ought* to make no difference. It is evident that to maintain that we ought to go on doing our duty anyway, whether our actions be determined or free, is to assume the continuance of the sense of duty, and so to beg the question. But more commonly it is argued that a deterministic theory of the will is morally beneficial, because it emphasizes the connectedness between character and conduct on the one hand, and between conduct and external events on the other. It is in an orderly world that acts express character and determine events. Moreover the good man is the reliable man, whose act can be anticipated when his character is known.\* Now it is indubitably true that the moral agent must regard phenomena as following a fixed routine. But it is equally certain that he expects no unalterable consistency in his fellow-being, just in so far as he regards him as a moral being. To be sure, his moral nature approves another's constant goodness, but for the sake of the goodness, and not the constancy. Much more conspicuous in both approval and disapproval, is the assumption that such another is free to do either better or worse than is actually the case. Similarly, the moral agent may regard himself as a series of events, and whatever he can learn about his own habits of mind and body is of the same practical advantage as any information that he may possess respecting nature or society. But just in so far as he regards himself as a moral being, he believes himself to be capable of alternatives, one alternative being the very possibility of acquiring and profiting by a knowledge of himself. Hence the fallacy of arguing that if we were to become "fatalistic," it would "result in an earnest adherence to such physical and psychical laws governing the origination of impulse as are known, and an equally earnest search for such as are not yet discovered."† The very heart

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\*Cf. Ritchie: "Free-will and Responsibility," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. V., p. 409.

†Bevington: "Determination and Duty," *Mind*, Vol. V., p. 41.

of the matter is this *earnestness* that is so calmly taken for granted. And it is this earnestness, so indispensable for all good undertakings, that requires an accompanying belief in the will's free creative power. The truth of determinism could not be practically beneficial unless it could stir in some individual the will to make use of it; and then the will to achieve it would belie its content.

To experience this practical significance of freedom, the philosopher has only to consult his own attitude toward his own philosophy, be that philosophy libertarian or deterministic. Spinoza is the most representative and consistent of necessitarians, but when we turn from his doctrines to his life, we find that the very enthusiasm which he felt for his own moral philosophy led him to transcend it. Here he is a man of high endeavor, chiding and praising his friends, and seeking to inspire them with new ardor and higher purposes. He is far from standing to everything in "an attitude of assent," when at the close of a letter wherein he has been emphasizing the necessity of clear and distinct perceptions for the highest knowledge, he writes such words as these: "It only remains to remind you, that all these questions demand assiduous study, and great firmness of disposition and purpose. In order to fulfil these conditions, it is of prime necessity to follow a fixed mode and plan of living, and to set before one some definite aim."\* Spinoza wrote a burning letter of remonstrance and exhortation to his pupil Albert Burgh upon the latter's desertion of the life of reason for the superstition of Romanism.† To another friend he addresses these words: "Meanwhile, I should like to ask you, nay I beg and entreat you by our friendship, to apply yourself to some serious work with real study, and to devote the chief part of your life to the cultivation of your understanding and your soul."‡ Spinoza could never have justified the spirit that animates such words by any demonstration in his physics or morals. Though the content of his ideal is for the most part a consistent application of his metaphysics, it only became a controlling force in his own life

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\*Letter LXIII., Bohn's Ed., Vol. II., p. 389.

†Letter LXXIV., *ibid*, p. 414.

‡Letter XLI., A, *ibid*, p. 359.

when he supplemented it with a belief in freedom. Spinoza has contributed to philosophy the most reasonable as well as the most exalted system of necessitarian ethics that human thought has conceived. And yet upon reflection we must admit that the exalted character of such a morality depends for us upon the half-unconscious assumption that it may be realized in human life as the result of some individual's free aspiration and endeavor. In short, define the moral ideal as you will, it only comes home to the individual when he assumes the option of realizing or neglecting it. Having obtained from the moral consciousness a statement of its claims to freedom, let us now consider the compatibility of these claims with certain philosophical conceptions of human nature. Such an inquiry will lead us to the formulation of a definite thesis.

The practical consciousness of freedom is the belief on the part of the moral individual that alternatives are genuinely possible. It is not alone the conviction that what is about to happen will happen by virtue of his own will, but that in his voluntary undertaking, a real choice is made, which might be made otherwise. In other words, it is presupposed that under identical conditions two or more different events are possible. The opposition between such a proposition and a naturalistic account of the universe is clear and unmistakable. Freedom as it has just been described, implies a succession of moments, the second of which is not contained implicitly in the first. Mechanism, therefore, avowedly contradicts freedom. In a mechanical universe every fact without exception is member of a causal series, where each state contains within itself the explication of its antecedents and the implication of its consequents. My act is only the execution of that which was decreed at the beginning of the world's history. Such an interpretation of the universe is an explicit denial of freedom, and only serves to define and illumine the meaning of that term.

But there is another kind of determinism that can assume such a multitude of disguises as to be fairly bewildering. There is an interpretation of the world that is espoused by determinists and nominal freedomists alike, which threatens to confuse hopelessly the whole issue. The interpretation in

question is as follows: In the last analysis the world is some nature that is out of time. Spinoza calls this essential nature Substance; Schopenhauer, Will; Schilling and Hegel, Reason. It may, for our purposes, be anything, so long as it is the super-temporal and immutable character of the universe. Its generic name is the Absolute. This may seem to be a very summary way of dealing with these metaphysical principles, but since we are primarily interested in freedom we are justified in treating them together, if it can be pointed out that their consequences for freedom are the same. The universe taken as a whole, it is said to have a certain fixed character *sub specie eternitatis*. The facts of the temporal sequence may or may not be free from mutual determination, but their occurrence and nature are prescribed by the character or fact of the whole. The universe, let us say, is ABC, from some all-inclusive super-temporal point of view. Then, although C is not determined by B nor B by A, each is essential to the whole. C is not inevitable from the point of view of AB, but it is nevertheless inevitable as part and parcel of the everlasting content of this specific universe ABC. This would seem clearly and explicitly to debar freedom. But, strangely enough, the philosophers who have had the most to say about freedom during this last century, are the philosophers who have been most zealous in developing and defending a metaphysics of this apparently antagonistic order. Such are Kant, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Hegel, and, as a representative of the later idealists, Prof. Royce. This may seem to be a very unwarranted and superficial grouping together of philosophers that are deeply sundered in their fundamental thought. Kant, for example, the great champion of moral freedom, is here classified with Schopenhauer, an avowed fatalist. But the Kant of the first Critique debarred freedom from the temporal-phenomenal world, and relegated it to that department of the universe which, whatever else it may be, is certainly changeless and eternal. A careful study of Kant's three Critiques fails to discover any element or event in the universe that is not inevitable.\* The only kind of freedom that

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\*Cf. The writer's article, "The Abstract Freedom of Kant," *Philosophical Review* Vol. IV., p. 630.

can find its way into Kant's world is of the same brand as Schopenhauer's, and can properly be discussed in conjunction with it. Then, again, it seems hard to put Fichte in such company; he to whom freedom was an enthusiasm and a gospel. To Fichte we undoubtedly owe more than to any other philosopher, for our understanding of the logical meaning and implications of freedom. But the fact nevertheless remains that the absolutism of his metaphysics makes him fundamentally a determinist. Even when a super-temporal Absolute is baptized with the name of "Free Activity," its real nature inhibits freedom. I believe that a thorough examination of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian idealists in connection with this matter of freedom, differentiates them from Spinoza in only one essential respect. Whereas that philosopher called his Absolute by the name of Necessity, these have called theirs Freedom.

Let us consider briefly the argument of these "pseudo-freedomists." The universe, they say, has a certain eternal character. The parts, since they are needed to contribute to this total character, are fixed and definite. But the nature of the world in the last analysis is inexplicable. This will be true whatever that nature may be specified to be. If the world is governed by a wise Providence, or is an interplay of blind forces, the fact that it is such a world has to be accepted without questioning. Here at last the question "Why?" is inapplicable. It is, as we say, "a matter of fact," and there is an end of it. And this is what certain philosophers have called freedom. The argument runs somewhat in this wise. What determined the universe as a whole to be what it is? Answer: Nothing. Ergo: The universe as a whole is self-determined or free. The universe *sub specie eternitatis* is an ultimate, undervived and therefore free. The human individual unfortunately is not free in any of his specific acts, but he shares this ultimate nature of the world, and so participates in its irreducibility. His character is an essential part of this undervived Absolute, and shares its freedom. Let Schopenhauer speak for the pseudo-freedomists. The Absolute Will he finds to be free in the sense that it is unconditioned. "The concept of freedom," he says, "is thus properly a negative concept, for its con-

tent is merely the denial of necessity, *i. e.* the relation of consequent to its reason, according to the principle of sufficient reason.”\* The individual character as a super-temporal reality shares with the Absolute this freedom from the principle of cause and effect. And “accordingly,” Schopenhauer concludes, “while our several actions are in no wise free, every man’s individual character is to be regarded as a free act. He is such and such a man, because once for all it is his will to be that man.”† It is hard to take such a proposition as this seriously. It involves the misuse of definite terms, and a palpable *non sequitur*. This Absolute, because in its entirety it is an inexplicable and final fact, is said to choose itself. Given M, by hypothesis an ultimate fact, it is by definition not chosen by anything beyond itself; ergo, it is self-chosen. A similar argument might run in this way: A, being by definition the only inhabitant of the universe, was not slain by anyone else; ergo, A committed suicide. A very exacting critic might suggest that perhaps A is not dead; and similarly that perhaps M is not chosen. It is at least a possibility that the universe is such as to exclude entirely the conception of choice, and so of freedom. The assertion that M is not chosen by anything beyond itself, by no means compels us to agree that it is self-chosen.

This contingency of the universe in the last analysis is true, but it is a trifling fact and one with no philosophical significance. We can readily agree with Schopenhauer when he says of his Absolute that such an object “might not be at all, or it might be originally and essentially something quite different from what it is.” But by this assertion Schopenhauer can only mean that such alternatives are conceivable, which is merely acknowledging a certain elasticity and irrelevance in human imagination. To endow “existence in general,” or the Absolute, with freedom, is another and quite a different matter. What can it mean to say that existence in general is free to exist or not to exist? If existence is free, it must exist to be

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\*“World as Will and Idea,” tr., Vol. I., p. 369.

†“Free-will and Fatalism,” tr. by Saunders: “On Human Nature,” p. 69.

free, and therefore cannot be free not to exist. It is exactly the same to speak of the Absolute as being free to be otherwise than it is. It must exist in order to be free, and since its character is immutable, this very existence denies its freedom. Schopenhauer undertook to reconcile the formula, "*operari sequitur esse*," with the assertion that freedom is an attribute of the "*esse*." It is plain that if the "*operari*" is but an unfolding of the "*esse*," the "*esse*" cannot originate in any act at all.\* When freedom is utterly debarred from the sphere of action, it is inconsistent to say that the existent is free to be otherwise than it is. Then what possible reasonableness can there be in claiming freedom for an ultimate character, whether it be that of the individual or of the universe as a whole? It would only be true if freedom were defined as mere absence of external limitation. Such a definition, however, is an assumption without the support of either common sense or reason. If the nature of the universe be such as to admit of no change, then there is an inner determination every whit as antagonistic to freedom as the most rigid mechanical causation. In both cases the individual must submit to the presumption that the future, even when he makes it himself, is inevitable.

The most recent contribution to the Neo-Kantian definition of freedom has been made by Professor Royce.† "The sole possible free moral action," he says, "is then a freedom that relates to the present fixing of attention upon the ideas of the Ought which are already present." Similarly, "to sin is *consciously to choose to forget* . . . an ought that one already recognizes." But the kind of choice here referred to is defined in this characteristic announcement: "Our theory is, that, despite all the causal dependence of the Self upon its own past, and upon all its social and natural conditions, just this act of attention, at this temporal instant, never occurred before, and will never occur again, and is, in so far, unique, individual, incapable of any complete causal explanation, and is, in consequence, the free act of this self."‡ This is a specification of the more

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\*Martineau's "Study of Religion," Vol. II., p. 306.

†"The World and the Individual." Second Series, "Nature, Man and the Moral Order." Cf. Chapters VII. and VIII.

‡Ibid, p. 359.

general statement of the earlier volume: "By our activity, then, I mean just the unique significance of the present expression of our will."\* Activity, choice and freedom are thus defined as identical with the unique or individual aspect of being, and Prof. Royce's account of the matter does not exempt him from the criticism that has been urged against the more bald statement of Schopenhauer. Both fail to justify the individual's belief that by his private act he may achieve one of two or more alternatives. Both ascribe freedom to an eternal world in which the temporal series is but an aspect of a changeless whole. Under these circumstances, for a finite being who is in the midst of the temporal series, there is a sense of uniqueness, and an illusion of plural possibility; but from the supreme point of view the entire series is seen to be but the unfolding of an immutable nature.

We have now reached a point where we can propose this definite thesis: *The practical consciousness of freedom implies that the ultimate nature of the universe is subject to temporal change.* It is obvious that the question of freedom arises originally in connection with the temporal series. The act is said to be free when it is a genuine selection made at a temporal moment. The moment is temporal because it involves a subsequent moment when the selection shall be completely realized as fact. Without this succession of moments selection, according to our general understanding of that term, would be impossible. There must be a moment when there is given a plurality of plans or possibilities, and a second when one of these is actualized, and the remainder have become impossibilities. Moreover it is absolutely essential that this succession should itself determine, and not be determined by, the ultimate nature of the universe. Let M represent the first moment of time, and a, b and c the alternative possibilities presented to the agent. The individual is free only when a, b and c are genuine possibilities. He does not ask merely that they shall appear *to him* as real alternatives, but that the universe shall be of such a nature as absolutely to permit either a, b or c to become actual in N, the next moment of time. Suppose a to

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\*"The World and the Individual"; First Series, p. 468.

be selected, and to be actual at the moment N. In this transition from M to N, b and c have been changed from genuine possibilities to absolute impossibilities. But possibility and impossibility can rest only upon the ultimate structure of the universe. Short of this there can only be apparent possibility and impossibility. Therefore in the succession MN the ultimate structure of the universe has changed. In order that this may be, the whole universe must be in the time of which M and N are moments. Thus a finished universe, whatever be the nature of such a unity, cannot satisfy the demands of freedom. These demands can be satisfied only by a world that is in the making and subject to change and increase.

In conclusion, and by way of confirmation, let me refer briefly to the determinists' own interpretation of the moral consciousness. We may well confine ourselves to the nominal freedomists whom we have already examined, as they are alone conspicuous for their efforts to accredit the sense of duty and the sense of responsibility. Kant maintains that duty is an appeal to freedom, but he saw the implication of duty without providing for it. Admitting that duty was valid only in a world of freedom, he was obliged to relegate it to his noumenal or super-temporal region of reality. His principle of autonomy makes it necessary that the law and the will that is subject to the law shall be alike of the changeless and eternal order. So the Categorical Imperative turns out to be a law that is always obeyed. By virtue of my intelligible will I am committed irrevocably to a course of action that is prescribed by the eternal truth. As all my moral acts are regulated by this transcendental law, the only division of conduct is between acts that are morally right and acts that are morally indifferent. These latter do not properly constitute conduct at all, but are events in the phenomenal order of cause and effect. Professor Royce describes the consciousness of duty as the obligation to *attend* to the good. Duty is the implicitness of the ideal meaning in any incomplete fragment. In so far as I am real, my life has a meaning that is implicitly identical with the meaning of the whole. This meaning of the whole is the Good, and I am therefore real just in so far as I am good.

Duty is the logical appeal to me to be that which in truth I am. The freedom of my goodness consists in my participation in the individual character of the goodness of the whole. Neither the whole nor any of its parts is finally explicable in any terms save the fact that it wills to be, or finds itself good. Sin arises from the possibility of inattention. My free sinning is the fact of my inattention, a fact that is finally as arbitrary as my attention. But inattention is the negation of being, the limiting principle that accounts for degrees of reality. Inattention does not create a being that is evil. It is not permitted me to make real that which is not serviceable to the Good. Strictly speaking, then, Professor Royce's theory does not permit of both good and evil achievement, but rather only of the alternative of being and non-being. And even this alternative finally resolves itself into the two aspects possessed by any eternal meaning that is constituted by the immanence of the one in the many. Look from the many toward the one, or search for the one in the many, and you discover being and good; look from the one towards the many, or rest satisfied with the many particulars, and you experience non-being and evil. There is no provision either here or in the less metaphysical statements of Kant, for alternative being. It was Kant's own complaint against the necessitarian that he removed from the moral agent the control over his own acts; or, in Kant's own words, "that the determining principles of every action of the same belong to past time, and are no longer in his power." As Kant and his successors have left it, these determining principles do not belong to time at all. They are as completely beyond the reach of the moral agent at the time of his act as if they were a part of the causal series, for they belong to an irrevocable eternity. At the time of my temporal act, I am suffering the consequences of my eternal fiat. We are justified in applying to Kant, and to those who with him stake their moral philosophy upon a theory of super-temporal reality, the general truth that where there is no real alternative to the performance of duty, that term is stripped of its distinctive meaning for the common moral consciousness.

But can the same be said of the term *responsibility*?

Schopenhauer invites our attention here, because he retains this conception even when he discards the other. He maintains that the individual is responsible for his acts because his eternal character is underived. His responsibility is the same fact as his freedom, and both mean simply the irreducibility of an ultimate fact. "Others assert," he says, "that a man is his own work guided by the light of knowledge. I, on the contrary, say that he is his own work before all knowledge."\* If a man is his own work, then, seemingly, he is responsible for himself in a very positive sense. But if the discussion up to this point has been conclusive at all, it has already demonstrated the falsity of such reasoning. The individual, as Schopenhauer describes him, can in no sense properly be said to have chosen to be. He awakes to consciousness only to find the choice already made, and his sole function is to experience its consequences. There is no ground for responsibility in the sense that the individual is the real author either of himself or his acts. However, if the individual is not responsible for himself, who or what is responsible for him? This dilemma seems to precipitate Schopenhauer's definition of responsibility in terms of an absence of ulterior conditions. But what meaning can there be in the statement that ultimate fact is responsible for itself? As our practical consciousness defines this conception, there could be no clearer instance of irresponsibility. That which could never be otherwise than it is escapes all accountability. Schopenhauer's is not the only solution of the dilemma suggested above. If the individual is not positively responsible for his character or deeds, and if nothing beyond him is responsible for them, then perhaps there is *no* responsibility for them. In other words, to say that the ultimate constitution of the universe is responsible for all temporal events and all super-temporal natures, is the same as to say that there is no responsibility whatever. We must conclude that a metaphysical theory which fails to provide for the freedom of real alternatives, fails also to provide for responsibility.

I have attempted in this discussion to deal with conceptions derived from the average moral consciousness. I have en-

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\*"World as Will and Idea," tr., Vol. I., p. 378.

deavored to show that the practical conceptions of duty and responsibility imply a definite conception of freedom. This conception of freedom has in turn been found to involve a metaphysical conception of fundamental importance, and a conception that is antagonistic alike to the temporal determinism of naturalism, and the super-temporal determinism of idealism. When the human individual believes that he is responsible for the fulfillment or violation of his duty, he believes that he inhabits a universe which permits a selection from among genuine possibilities and suffers absolute change. Either the positivist or the transcendentalist may have discovered a higher truth than that which can be directly derived from the moral experience. It is true, as Professor Royce says, that when one maintains a conception as finally valid, "he becomes responsible for an ontology." But whatever is done in the direction of comparing philosophy and life, is a gain for both. And where, as in this case, there is a serious difference relating to the fundamental concerns of each, it is the part of philosophy either to correct a universal misconception, or to be more faithful and direct in its interpretation of life.

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## MIND AND NATURE.

THERE is no thought more familiar, and few more disquieting, to the reflective man of to-day than that of the utter deadness and soullessness of the vast world of things around us. It is indeed an inevitable consequence of influences from which we cannot withdraw ourselves that we, town-dwellers and creatures of the library and laboratory, who are perforce, in the common round of our daily life, witnesses of the practical triumphs of mechanical invention, and by the nature of our chosen studies all more or less brought acquainted with the methods and ideas of the mechanical sciences, should take the intellectual impress of our surroundings. Living in almost